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Abstract: Experimental philosophy is an emerging methodology which attempts to use empirically 
gathered data to break new ground on longstanding philosophical debates. Experimental 
philosophers claim that “armchair” intuitions about philosophical concepts need to be empirically 
verified among the general population, and that where the two differ the latter cannot be 
disregarded.  I intend to argue that while this approach has its merits it has been plagued by some 
fundamental misconceptions about the nature of intuitions themselves.  Once these 
misconceptions are addressed, however, I believe experimental philosophy can mature into a 
fruitful new paradigm, and can achieve its goal of breathing new life into modern philosophy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Surely everyone would agree that the argumentative form, “Surely everyone would agree 
that…,” is one of the most beloved in all of philosophy.  Appeals to what feel like basic, 
unquestionable, even pre-philosophic intuitions are quite powerful.  By showing the reader that 
each of his or her basic premises is obviously, intuitively correct, a philosopher can construct 
arguments and theories which will stand up well to criticism.  We want to embrace theories that 
feel right.  But arguments of this form, appealing to everyone’s gut, their intuitions, beg a question 
which few have ever thought to ask: does everyone share the philosopher’s intuitions in the first 
place?  Within the last couple of years an upstart field, calling itself experimental philosophy, has 
begun to ask this question.  In a radical departure from the methods of traditional philosophy, 
experimental philosophers use social psychological methods to discover what beliefs people 
actually hold on certain philosophical issues.  They claim that the intuitions and ideas of John and 
Jane Doe may not always be identical to those of trained (typically Western) philosophers, but 
more importantly that John and Jane’s intuitions are of vital importance to philosophical theories, 
and need to be a part of the discussion.  Consequently, it threatens some established philosophical 
beliefs which are either explicitly or implicitly based on appeals to people’s intuitions, and has 
sparked a good deal of controversy in the process.  It has had a polarizing effect in its interactions 
with mainstream modern philosophy, and as such the available metaphilosophical analyses of the 
field tend to be just as black and white; few unbiased critiques exist of experimental philosophy’s 
merits and flaws.  It is my goal to provide such a critique, and in the process to argue for two major 
points which I believe to be of central importance to experimental philosophy’s future success.  
First, I wish to argue that while the concept of studying laypeople’s intuitions is sound, and 
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potentially useful, a lack of attention to the nature of intuitions themselves, and the processes by 
which we arrive at them, has been holding experimental philosophy back.  Second, I will argue that 
if experimental philosophy can move past this misconception, or even better, expand its reach 
beyond the bounds of intuitions, a multitude of new directions for exploration will become 
available.    
In order to give the reader a context in which to view these two arguments, I will first provide a 
brief history of experimental philosophy and a short description of its typical methodology. I will 
then outline some of the active debates in the field, followed by what an account of how I believe 
intuitions have been misperceived and misapplied to these debates. Finally, I will discuss the recent 
appearance of experimental studies which have moved away from using intuitions as their data, and 
suggest a few possible directions for future research along these lines. 
 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND ORIGINS OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
Experimental philosophy arose from a very real issue not just in modern philosophy, but in 
the entire history of philosophical thought.  The issue: philosophers’ reliance on their own 
intuitions as evidence for advancing their respective philosophical theories.  From Plato’s theory of 
ideas, to Immanuel Kant’s incongruous counterparts, to Thomas Nagel’s musings on what it might 
be like to be a bat, intuitions have furnished evidence and played a central role in advancing 
philosophical theories for thousands of years.   
However, within the last century, the landscape has changed in some interesting ways.  
Since the beginning of the 20th century, analytic philosophy has radically changed the way most 
modern philosophy is done, especially in the English-speaking world.  Rather than going after a 
grand theory of the universe in one fell swoop, as had been done by almost every major 
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philosopher from the Greeks to William James, analytic philosophy takes a divide-and-conquer 
approach.  It evaluates individual, often highly specific issues one at a time.  In this regard, analytic 
philosophy has been heavily influenced by the natural sciences, and accordingly relies heavily upon 
formal logic and “empirical” investigation.  I place “empirical” in scare quotes here because despite 
the influence of science on analytic philosophy, the two have very different understandings of what 
counts as empirical evidence.  This is the first major point of entry for experimental philosophy. 
Naturally, what is taken as empirical evidence varies from science to science.  Psychology and 
particle physics, for example, use appreciably different kinds of empirical evidence.  But no matter 
what form it may take, all empirical evidence across the natural and social sciences shares a few 
fundamental characteristics.  First and foremost, it is objective1---based either on observation, or, 
more commonly, experimentation in the physical world.  Inherent in this is another, crucial feature 
of scientific empirical evidence: replicability.  A great deal of care is taken in designing scientific 
experiments such that upon reading a paper, anyone with sufficient expertise could re-run the 
experiment themselves and achieve the same results.  It is not difficult to see how this 
characterization of empirical evidence differs vastly from that of philosophers. Even among analytic 
philosophers, the exact same thought experiment can yield vastly different “results” depending on 
who is thinking about it.2  Although it takes many shapes, some of which I will discuss later, the 
most common form of experimental philosophy attempts to settle such disputes by investigating 
everyday people’s intuitions.  These, in turn, are used to determine the contours of our folk 
concepts, such as those of “knowledge” and “intentional action.”  In the process it aims to explain 
both intra- and inter-personal variations in intuitions, and reveal any previously unrecognized 
biases that may be occluding our actual concepts.  Stated philosophically, it is a matter of sources 
																																								 																				
1	Or,	at	the	very	least,	able	to	gain	the	overwhelming	consensus	of	the	scientific	community.	See	Kuhn	(1962).	
2	For	further	discussion	of	some	of	the	points	outlined	in	this	paragraph,	see	Prinz	(2008).		
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and warrant; experimental philosophy explores the sources of our beliefs and, once it has 
discovered them, uses this newfound knowledge to determine whether or not those beliefs are 
warranted (Knobe & Nichols, 2008).  Experimental philosophers hope that by uncovering the 
contours and usages of our folk concepts, they can shift the burden of proof to philosophers who 
make claims which run contrary to these folk conceptions, and possibly even settle some 
arguments once and for all. 
 While it is debatable whether or not analytic philosophy has made philosophical intuitions 
any more scientifically empirical—intuitions in analytic philosophy still lack objectivity and 
replicability—it has indisputably changed the types of intuitions to which most philosophers appeal. 
In essence I believe these new intuitions are still the product of subjective, first-person experience.  
Intuitions in analytic philosophy are merely couched in high-flung verbiage and technical terms, 
and tend to be more specific and limited in scope.  Experimental philosophy is the most recent 
response to this change, but the seeds of discontent have been present for decades.  In the forward 
to his 1969 book, Must We Mean What We Say?, Stanley Cavell remarks: 
Meaning what one says becomes a matter of making one’s sense present to oneself…as 
though the words we use in philosophy…are away…Take, for example, the fact that the 
isolated analytical article is the common form of philosophical expression now, in the 
English speaking world of philosophy…This is often interpreted as symptomatic of 
philosophy’s withdrawal from its cultural responsibilities...[we are] ignorant of our cultural 
situation… (pp. xix-xx). 
 
Clearly Cavell was not referring directly to experimental philosophy, which did not arise for 
another 30 or so years.  But his word choice and depictions of modern philosophy throughout the 
entire book bear a striking, even uncanny, resemblance to how experimental philosophers have 
described the need for their methods that exists in the sphere of modern philosophical thought.  
As Knobe and Nichols (2008) have recently stated, “The rise of analytic philosophy led to a 
diminished interest in questions about, for example, the fundamental sources of religious faith and 
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a heightened interest in more technical questions…” (p. 7).  They claim that experimental 
philosophy is a direct response to this sort of shift.  As a concrete example, modern philosophy of 
mind is populated with terms such as functionalism, representationalism, heterophenomenology, 
and higher-order global states.  It is hard to get much further away from everyday language.  During 
the 1950s, Ordinary Language Philosophy placed a heavy emphasis on just such everyday language, 
albeit in the form of complex logical analyses of it.   However, even the importance of ordinary 
language in philosophy has faded in and out since then, and has been mostly replaced by efforts to 
make even more esoteric formal logic the core of language.  Wherever intuition is called upon, it is 
almost always of a shallow, technical sort in the sense described by Nichols and Knobe.  The trend 
has persisted for decades, and is now being attacked by experimental philosophy.  Knobe, Nichols, 
and other like-minded thinkers represent a new breed of philosophers, who seek to reverse this 
trend of intuitional superficiality and return to discussing more basic, more fundamental questions 
about the sources of our religious, moral, and metaphysical beliefs (Knobe and Nichols, 2008).  
Experimental philosophy is in a somewhat unusual position.  It continues this analytical 
legacy through its emphasis on the methods of modern cognitive science, but is also a refutation of 
some of analytical philosophy’s most fundamental methods, namely the inconsistent, technical, 
and often unsubstantiated nature of the intuitions it relies upon.  The primary goal of experimental 
philosophy is to shed light on what philosophical intuitions people actually happen to have as 
means of examining the folk concepts that actually exist in the world, and in so doing to steer the 
course of modern philosophical debates in a less stagnant, more productive direction.  I believe 
that in theory this sort of approach has its merits.  In practice, however, experimental has had 
some growing pains, most of which center around the concept of intuitions.  Before moving on I 
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will briefly review the prototypical experimental philosophy methodology in order to provide those 
unfamiliar with the field a context in which to consider these intuitional shortcomings. 
 
THE EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 
It is probably a misnomer to call experimental philosophy a field of study.  Early in its 
history, its close-knit band of practitioners tended to have converging views on many philosophical 
issues.  As it has developed, however, experimental philosophy has grown to include a huge 
diversity of standpoints in a multitude of important philosophical domains.  Metaphysics, 
epistemology, ethics, consciousness, metaphilosophy---experimental philosophy has generated 
important findings in all of these areas.  Much more than a field of study, it is a methodology, a 
unique approach which could potentially be used by a wide variety of people from all sorts of 
philosophical camps.  As Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (2008) aptly state, “What we are 
proposing is just to add another tool to the philosopher’s toolbox. That is, we are proposing 
another method (on top of all of the ones that already exist) for pursuing certain philosophical 
inquiries” (p. 10). 
So what exactly is the method?  Although nothing about the concept of experimental 
philosophy restricts it to invoking just one scientific field, virtually all experimental philosophy 
studies conducted thus far have been a hybrid of psychology and modern analytic philosophy3.  As 
these two fields have grown over the last 125 years, unfortunately they have grown apart.  There is 
surprisingly little communication between them — philosophers tend to be relatively uninformed 
about developments in psychology, and psychologists tend not to bother themselves with trying to 
																																								 																				
3	As	Jesse	Prinz	(2008)	rightly	notes,	areas	like	metaphysics,	for	example,	might	not	have	much	to	gain	from	the	
application	of	psychological	methods.		But	metaphysics	could	benefit	tremendously	from	increased	interaction	and	
understanding	between	physicists	and	philosophers.		This	illustrates	the	larger	point,	discussed	at	length	in	my	
final	section,	of	the	vast	amount	of	room	for	expansion	in	experimental	philosophy.	
9	
	
decipher modern theories in philosophy. What’s more, the two camps have completely different 
styles of writing, modes of thought, and theoretical lineages.  As part of the growing body of 
interdisciplinary research brought about by the advent of cognitive science, experimental 
philosophy attempts to bridge this gap---it applies the findings and methods of experimental 
psychology to some of the seemingly intractable problems of modern philosophy.  
By and large, experimental philosophy’s preferred method of empirical investigation is the 
survey.  There are a couple of reasons for this.  Jesse Prinz (2008) explains that philosophy’s 
primary method for eliciting intuitions is the thought experiment, and these are relatively easy to 
convert into surveys.  The researcher merely has to simplify the language and ideas involved in the 
thought experiment so that someone without a philosophy PhD can understand it, ask people what 
they think about it, and examine the results to divine truths about their concepts and beliefs.  In 
this way, surveys are a natural extension of the traditional philosophical method.  They are also 
relatively simple to design, far less expensive than other modes of psychological research, and 
participants are much easier to find (typically undergraduate students in introductory level classes).  
This makes them an additionally logical first step for philosophers without extensive training in 
experimental design and limited financial and laboratory resources.  Studies involving reaction 
times, behavioral manipulations, and neuroimaging, for example, have not been extensively used 
by experimental philosophers for pragmatic reasons of this nature, not because they are inherently 
useless to philosophy.  On the contrary, recent experiments which have begun to use such 
methods are yielding some fascinating results.  But setting that aside for later, experimental 
philosophers, armed merely with their surveys, have been able to gather some very interesting and 
potentially profound results (Prinz, 2008). 
10	
	
Take, for example, Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley (2006), who conducted a study to 
investigate how people normally attribute moral responsibility to an agent. Specifically, they 
hypothesized that two previously overlooked factors play a role in whether or not people will hold 
a transgressor morally responsible for an action: the extent to which he identifies with his action, 
and the amount of situational constraint placed upon him.  Surprisingly, they found that even when 
the agent was completely constrained and had no control over his actions, surveys showed that, on 
average, people still judged him to be morally responsible if he identified with the action he was 
forced to perform.  This presents a serious new issue to be examined in the philosophical debate 
over the relationship between free will and moral responsibility.   
Another good example of a study in a different philosophical arena, namely epistemology, 
is Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001).  Epistemology, broadly defined, is the study of knowledge 
---what forms it takes, in what situations it can be acquired, and how we can go about acquiring it.  
Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) present evidence which seriously challenges the search for 
universally normative solutions epistemological problems.  They presented classical 
epistemological thought experiments, in the form of short vignettes, to either Western or East 
Asian participants and recorded their respective intuitions on those vignettes. For example, in one 
condition the experimenters used a version of a Gettier case,4 which read as follows:  
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years.  Bob therefore thinks that Jill 
drives an American car.  He is not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, 
and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind of 
American car. Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only 
believe it?  
 
																																								 																				
4	For	a	long	time	epistemologists	believed	that	knowledge	was	simply	justified	true	belief.		However,	in	1963	
Edmund	Gettier	challenged	that	notion	by	introducing	a	class	of	thought	experiments	where	a	person	has	a	
justified	true	belief,	but	we	still	feel	like	he	or	she	does	not	have	real	knowledge.		This	inconsistency	arises	because	
although	the	subject	of	the	Gettier	case	has	a	justified	true	belief,	the	way	in	which	he	or	she	acquired	it	was	
unanticipated	or	accidental.			
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Over 70 percent of Western participants gave what has come to be the standard answer among 
contemporary philosophers, that Bob “only believes” Jill drives an American car.  However, 
among East Asian participants exactly the opposite pattern was found: the majority believed that 
Bob “really knows” Jill drives an American car.  The experimenters also found major 
discrepancies in the answers given by participants of different socioeconomic classes, even within 
the same culture (the same city, actually).  This sort of cultural variability in laypeople’s pre-
theoretical intuitions is a major hurdle for normative epistemological theories---one that may even 
be insurmountable.  If people have different intuitions, then whose intuitions count?  That’s a 
tough question to answer.  
In addition to their interesting results, I invoke Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley (2006) and 
Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) because they are both good illustrations of the way in which 
experimental philosophy is done, but are very different in from each other in form and content.   
In the former study, all three authors have a background in experimental psychology5, and 
therefore their paper reads very much like something one would find in a peer-reviewed 
psychology journal.  It has a clearly defined introduction and literature review, methods sections, 
results sections, and discussion.  Also, the main issue at hand in the paper---the psychology of 
moral responsibility---is not in itself all that new for the field of psychology.  Many papers have 
been published on the subject, dating back to the 1970s and beyond (see Hamilton & Sanders, 
1981; Darley & Latané, 1969; Lerner & Miller, 1978; for representative examples).  The study by 
Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich, however, differs substantially.  It does not read like a psychology 
journal article, but much more like an analytical philosophy paper.  It is not organized by 
introduction, literature review, etc., but by background, theses, proofs, and objections/replies.  In 
																																								 																				
5	John	Darley,	in	particular,	is	actually	an	exceedingly	influential	social	psychologist.		Along	with	Bibb	Latané,	he	
was	the	first	to	demonstrate	the	now-famous	“Bystander	Effect”	in	1969.		
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addition to the format, Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich explore a subject matter which, to the best of 
my knowledge, has yet to be explored in the field of psychology.  Research on theory of mind 
comes close, but specific epistemological claims have not previously been tested using 
experimental methods (Prinz, 2008). 
By taking these two papers in conjunction, comparing them side-by-side, one can get a 
sense for the wide variety of subject matters and argumentative styles which are grouped under the 
umbrella of experimental philosophy.  At one pole there is psychology, at the other contemporary 
philosophy, and experimental philosophy papers blend the two in varying proportions.  But 
regardless of how they may differ in style and subject matter, the vast majority of experimental 
philosophy studies conducted thus far share one common goal: to gain insight into the pre-
theoretical philosophical intuitions, and ultimately the concepts, of everyday people.  This raises 
the question: why would they be interested in such a thing?  A key feature of philosophers’ claims 
to intuitions as evidence for or against a given argument is that their intuitions are shared by 
essentially everyone (Alexander, 2012).  However, no attempt has ever been made by any of these 
philosophers to empirically verify that this is indeed the case.  This is the first goal of experimental 
philosophy: to verify whether or not the intuitions put forth by various philosophers are actually 
shared by people everywhere. 
A common question that has sprung to many critics’ minds goes something like this: “Once 
these experimentalists discover whether or not a certain philosopher’s intuition is shared by the 
general population or not – what does it matter? What purpose is that newfound knowledge 
supposed to serve?”  This is where various camps in experimental philosophy begin to differ from 
one another.  Alexander, Mallon, and Weinberg (2014) define two major, conflicting views within 
experimental philosophy on how the intuitions of the general population are to be understood, the 
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so-called “positive program” and “negative program.”  The positive program claims that 
philosophical intuitions are a valuable source of evidence for philosophical theories, and that 
experimental philosophy is, or should be, and integral part of the process by which we ascertain 
these intuitions.  The negative program, on the other hand, sees experimental philosophy’s role as 
challenging the use, by anyone, of intuitions to advance philosophical theories (Alexander, Mallon, 
& Weinberg, 2014).  Both are relatively radical views.  My position is mostly in line with the 
negative program of experimental philosophy.  I do not believe that intuitions, as they are currently 
conceived, should be used as definitive evidence for any theory.  But unsurprisingly, reality is 
hardly so black and white.   
 
THE AMORPHOUSNESS OF INTUITIONS 
Before diving into the gritty details, it may be helpful to briefly outline some of the major 
debates in experimental philosophy which I will explore, as they pertain to the question of 
intuitions.  In this paper, I invoke a few important lines of inquiry, the first of which is the dispute 
over the nature of intentional action.  As Joshua Knobe (2008) states, “People normally distinguish 
between behaviors that are performed intentionally, (e.g. raising a glass of wine to one’s lips) and 
those that are performed unintentionally (e.g. spilling the wine all over one’s shirt)” (pp. 129-30).  
But how can we reliably distinguish which actions are intentional and which are unintentional? 
This is the point of discussion in philosophy.  Some, Joshua Knobe for example, believe that 
moral considerations can actually impact people’s judgments on whether or not an action was 
performed intentionally, even though normatively they probably should not.   
If he is correct, this effect is closely tied to the next, and perhaps largest, debate in experimental 
philosophy thus far: the compatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism.  This has 
14	
	
become an incredibly complex and multifaceted debate, however by and large the discussion in the 
experimental philosophy community is between so-called Natural Compatibilism (NC) and 
Natural Incompatibilism (NI).  Each of these terms has two parts.  Compatibilism, by itself, is the 
belief that determinism6 is consistent with both free will and moral responsibility, and that all three 
can exist in harmony.  Incompatibilism, on the other hand, is the belief that determinism is 
inconsistent with both free will and moral responsibility, and that they cannot co-exist.  Natural 
Compatibilism, then, is the idea that philosophically untrained, normal people have a compatibilist 
view of the world, and Natural Incompatibilism proposes that people naturally hold the opposing, 
incompatibilist view.   
I will restrict my discussion to the role that intuitions play in studies pertaining to these 
debates. The first issue I address is a descriptive one.  My question is:  What exactly is forming the 
data for these experimental philosophy studies?  Intuitions, yes—but what are these nebulous and 
seldom defined feelings, judgments, and dispositions what we lump together and call “intuitions?”  
The second issue is more prescriptive in nature.  In short, given the tremendous amount of 
variability and outside influence which can affect the formation of intuitions, should we really refer 
to “intuition” as a single, unified concept at all?  
 
What is an Intuition?  
Prior to beginning any scientific experiment, researchers must clearly define the terms used 
in the experiment.  A psychologist, for example, would not begin an experiment which measured 
participants’ reaction times without a clear understanding of what a reaction time is, and how to 
measure it.  In almost all experimental philosophy studies, intuitions are what the experimenter 
																																								 																				
6	Alfred	Mele	defines	determinism	as	the	idea	that	“at	any	instant	exactly	one	future	is	compatible	with	the	state	
of	the	universe	at	that	instant	and	the	laws	of	nature”	(Mele,	2006	,	p.	3).	
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aims to measure.  But what are intuitions?  And for that matter, how are they measured?  In his 
book Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction, Joshua Alexander covers a number of the 
competing accounts of intuitions.  Some believe philosophical intuitions are “simply beliefs, or 
perhaps inclinations to believe.”  Others think they are different from everyday beliefs because 
they feel “subjectively compelling or necessarily true.”  A third account claims that philosophical 
intuitions are “mental states ratified by a process of philosophical reflection” (Alexander, 2012, pp. 
20-25).  These few examples are by no means exhaustive — the list goes on.  The important point 
is the mere fact that there are varying interpretations of what counts as a philosophical intuition.  
This is clearly an issue for philosophy as a whole, which commonly makes use of intuitions, but it 
is an especially prominent issue for experimental philosophy since its raison d'être is explicitly 
examining the use and implications of intuitions. 
 I believe this variability in defining intuitions is a major problem for a few reasons.  The 
self-professed goal of experimental philosophy is to utilize the empirical, scientific methods of 
experimental psychology.  However, if there is no clear-cut definition of what intuitions are, then 
scientifically measuring them is impossible.  The natural first move here would be to attempt to 
formulate a standard definition of intuitions, perhaps the one that is used most commonly in 
various experiments.  As I will attempt to show, this may or may not be possible.  It may be the 
case that what is universally referred to as our “intuition” is actually a complex and variable blend 
of other, usually unconscious psychological processes, and that referring to them as one concept 
does not make sense.  In any case, there is a great deal about intuition which we do not yet 
understand.   
Many experimental philosophy papers have touched upon roughly this point, that 
intuitions are subject to external influence from competing cognitive systems, but to the best of my 
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knowledge, none have attempted to connect the dots and explain this “influence” systematically.  
The reasons for this are manifold, but two points by Jesse Prinz (2008) tell most of the story.  The 
vast majority of researchers active in experimental philosophy have a background, and training, in 
philosophy.  Few come from psychology departments, and this leads to a relative lack of interest in 
the cognitive processes which generate our intuitions.  The lion’s share of the effort is devoted to 
accurately describing what the specific lay concepts and intuitions actually are.  This is the first 
point.  The second deals with the use of surveys.  For the reasons previously stated, this has been 
the primary method of investigation for experimental philosophers so far.  But while surveys are 
useful for collecting intuitions, they are ill-equipped to tackle questions of psychological process 
which take place below the level of conscious awareness, which I believe is crucial for 
understanding the nature of the intuitions being collected. Surveys are also ill-equipped to directly 
folk concepts, which is most experimental philosophers’ primary goal.  Prinz submits that there are 
no ideological reasons which make philosophers opposed to directly examining concepts by 
conducting other forms of experiments, or to examining the cognitive basis of intuitions.  It is 
merely that their philosophical training has made these possibilities less accessible and less salient 
(Prinz, 2008).  
But unfortunately for philosophers who wish to examine folk concepts, it seems that using 
the current questionnaire methodology there is no way to get around the problem of intuitions, 
since they are what are being directly measured.  Again, this is mostly a practical issue.  As 
Alexander, Mallon, and Weinberg (2014) state, “…this observed variation in intuition would no 
longer pose a problem if we possessed a means for discerning epistemic wheat from chaff” (p. 38).  
They argue convincingly that this is impossible through survey research only, and that additional 
methods are needed in order to formulate such a theory of intuitions.  Nevertheless, I do not 
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believe that survey research has gotten us nowhere.  Comprehensive explanatory theories of 
intuitional variation may be off the table using surveys, but the patterns of responses in various 
survey-based experimental philosophy studies suggest some very interesting parallels to the 
reasoning, judgment and decision making, and expertise literatures in psychology, to name a few 
examples.  Let us take a closer look at one such underappreciated parallel between the 
experimental philosophies of morality and intentionality and the psychology of reasoning.  
 
Possible External Influences on Intuitions 
 Affective Influence 
 In perhaps the single most famous experimental philosophy study, Joshua Knobe (2003) 
examined how people judge that a specific action was intentional versus unintentional.  He 
presented random passers-by in Central Park with one of two scenarios.  The first involved an 
action which brought about a negative side effect:  
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are 
thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the 
environment.’  The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’  
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed (p. 191). 
 
The second scenario was logically identical, but involved a positive side effect rather than a 
negative one:  
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are 
thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help the 
environment.’ The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about helping the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’  
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped (p. 191). 
 
In the negative side effect scenario, 82 percent of participants believed the chairman harmed the 
environment intentionally, whereas in the positive side effect scenario, only 23 percent of 
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participants believed he helped the environment intentionally.  The two responses are clearly in 
conflict.  Knobe interprets these results to mean that the moral valence of an action plays a role in 
people’s attributions of intentionality; bad actions are more likely to be judged intentional than 
good ones, and thus application of the lay concept of intentionality is subject to an affective bias.  
This interference of negative side effects with judgments of intentionality has come to be known as 
the side-effect effect (Knobe, 2003).     
Alexander, Mallon, and Weinberg (2014) argue that this type of inference, that an affective 
bias is present, requires the ability to individuate the relevant systems which are involved, and that 
simple survey results do not make possible.  However, what if we did not have to derive the 
contours of the relative systems from Knobe’s survey results alone?  What if we already had 
detailed descriptions of such systems, and the question is merely whether or not these results can 
be explained as instantiations of them in a previously unstudied domain?  I believe such a system 
may be available in the dual-process theory of reasoning.  Experimental philosophy papers have 
posited some sort of dual-process, intuitional and rational, explanation for the results of Knobe 
(2003) (Cushman & Mele, 2008; Nichols & Knobe, 2008), but to the best of my knowledge only 
one (Pinillos et al., 2011) has attempted to tie it directly to the dual-process theory in the reasoning 
literature of psychology.  As the name implies, this theory posits two separate systems which 
people rely upon in different types of scenarios.  To use the terms introduced by Stanovich and 
West (2000), “System 1” is a quick, automatic, heuristic, and often emotional system for reasoning 
and decision-making, and takes place largely below the level of conscious awareness.  Only once 
the final product of the process has emerged do we become aware of it.  “System 2,” on the other 
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hand, is conscious, slow, methodical, and more capable of handling abstract reasoning.7  It is what 
philosophers normally think of as the special kind of “human reason” that sets us apart from the 
rest of the animal kingdom.  And, importantly, it is widely thought that System 2 has the ability to 
override System 1 when the need arises (Evans, 2003).  I believe this dual-process model, with its 
System 1 and System 2, provides a plausible explanation of Knobe’s results.  Those who used a 
more System 1 based method of arriving at their intuitions would likely respond the way the 
majority of Knobe’s participants did.  When reasoning takes place below the level of conscious 
awareness, the door is opened for emotion and/or other unidentified psychological influence to 
bias the reasoning process.  It is of no concern to System 1 that the answers which this produces 
are logically inconsistent.  However, those respondents who took the time to stop and use a System 
2 sort of method—who overrode their “gut reaction”—would see the inconsistency, and would thus 
respond in a more instinctively unnatural, but more logically consistent manner.  This may be what 
the 18 percent and 23 percent minorities in Knobe’s negative and positive conditions did. 
This is all very speculative in nature.  Evans (2003) offers a number of demonstrable effects 
which are typically interpreted as evidence of a dual-process influence.  For example, the ability of 
subjects to see past various biases and provide the logically correct answer to a syllogism has been 
shown to be correlated with general cognitive ability.  Therefore, if it can be shown that higher 
cognitive ability diminishes the side-effect effect, this would constitute fairly strong evidence that a 
dual-process effect is at work.  There is also evidence that a phenomenon called disfluency, where 
a person gets the feeling that something is amiss with his or her metacognitive processes, can also 
increase a person’s use of System 2 processes (Alter et al., 2007).  Again, if this can be shown to 
																																								 																				
7	A	System	1	method	of	arriving	at	intuitions	would	be	similar	to	Joshua	Alexander’s	(2012)	characterization	of	the	
Doxastic	or	Phenomenological	Conception	of	intuitions.		A	System	2	method	would	resemble	the	Etiological	or	
Methodological	Conception.		So	this	distinction	is	recognized	by	most	philosophers,	but	it	is	still	an	open	debate	as	
to	which	is	the	best	method.		This,	as	I	will	discuss,	I	believe	is	part	of	the	bigger	problem	of	intuitions.		
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apply to the side-effect effect, it would strongly indicate the involvement of two separate cognitive 
reasoning processes.  A recent study by Pinillos et al. (2011) has found just such results.  In 
separate experiments, they demonstrated that higher levels of intelligence8 and heightened levels of 
awareness9 both significantly reduced the influence of the side-effect effect.  The authors believe 
these results are best understood by appealing to the dual-process theory of reasoning.  
 Furthermore, it seems the dual-process effect on intuitions is not limited merely to 
discussions of the side-effect effect.  While such direct empirical testing of this claim has not yet 
been conducted, I believe there is significant anecdotal evidence that warrants further investigation.  
As an example of this, take Nichols and Knobe (2008), another hugely influential study in 
experimental philosophy which investigates the Natural Compatibilism (NC) versus Natural 
Incompatibilism (NI) debate.  To recap, NC posits the default, pre-philosophical, layperson’s view 
is that determinism, free will, and moral responsibility are consistent with one another.  NI, on the 
other hand, posits that laypeople naturally believe these concepts are incompatible.  Nichols and 
Knobe attempt to sort out which of these theories, NC or NI, is the correct characterization of the 
folk concept.  In this study, all participants were presented with descriptions of two universes.  
Universe A was deterministic, and Universe B was indeterministic.  The distinction between the 
two was made clear; participants were told: 
The key difference, then, is that in Universe A every decision is completely caused by what 
happened before the decision—given the past, each decision has to happen the way that it 
does.  By contrast, in Universe B, decisions are not completely caused by the past, and 
each human decision does not have to happen the way that it does. (Nichols & Knobe, 
2007, p. 111).    
																																								 																				
8	As	measured	by	the	number	of	correct	answers	(0,	1,	2,	or	3)	on	a	Cognitive	Reflection	Task	(CRT)	taken	after	
completing	a	version	of	the	Knobe	(2003)	paradigmatic	CEO	experiment	(Frederick,	2005).	
9	Pinillos	and	colleagues	used	the	following	logic:	“…each	CRT	question	is	designed	in	such	a	way	that	one’s	first	
pass	judgment	is	mistaken…	It	is	plausible	that	at	this	point,	you	are	now	made	aware	that	your	first	pass	judgment	
to	problems	may	very	well	be	mistaken.	Accordingly,	if	you	are	then	immediately	given	another	question,	this	
awareness	may	then	play	a	role	in	how	you	answer	that	question”	(Pinillos	et	al.,	2011).	
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Then, in a 2x2 factorial design (deterministic/indeterministic x high/low affect), participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the following two conditions: 
 High Affect: As he has done many times in the past, Bill stalks and rapes a 
stranger. Is it possible that Bill is fully morally responsible for raping the 
stranger? 
Low Affect: As he has done many times in the past, Mark arranges to cheat on 
his taxes. Is it possible that Mark is fully morally responsible for cheating on his 
taxes? ( Nichols and Knobe, 2008, p. 117 ). 
 
Participants were then asked to judge whether Bill and Mark were morally responsible for their 
actions.  As expected, the experimenters found that affect played a significant role in participants’ 
judgments of moral responsibility.  In the high affect (Bill) case, participants who were told that Bill 
was acting in an indeterministic universe judged him to be responsible 95 percent of the time.  
Interestingly, however, even when told Bill’s universe was deterministic, and that his actions had to 
happen the way they did, 64 percent of participants still judged him to be responsible for his 
actions.  So when emotion is high, a majority of participants held Bill responsible for his actions 
regardless of whether he had free will or not.  The pattern of responses in the low affect (Mark) 
cases was quite different.  In an indeterministic universe, 89 percent of participants felt Mark was 
responsible for cheating on his taxes.  But in the deterministic, no free will condition, only 23 
percent of people felt he was responsible.  Nichols and Knobe interpret this disparity in responses 
as evidence that the affective content of the scenario greatly impacts people’s judgments of moral 
responsibility.  They believe this to be an affective performance error just like the one 
demonstrated in Knobe (2003), causing people to make non-normative judgments in emotionally 
charged cases.  In emotionally neutral situations, they believe people correctly and competently use 
their concept of morality to arrive at incompatibilist judgments, making Natural Incompatibilism 
the correct theory (Nichols & Knobe, 2008). 
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 Although it would take further experimentation to confirm, I believe what Nichols and 
Knobe term “affective performance error” can, in this case, potentially be viewed as a slight 
variation on Evans et al.’s (1983) belief-bias effect.  Evans states, “One of the key methods for 
demonstrating dual-processes in reasoning tasks involves the so-called ‘belief-bias’ effect. The 
methodology introduced by Evans et al….seeks to create a conflict between responses based upon 
a process of logical reasoning and those derived from prior belief about the truth of conclusions” 
(Evans, 2003).  In studies on this effect, 4 types of syllogisms are typically presented to participants: 
1) valid argument, believable conclusion (no conflict), 2) valid argument, unbelievable conclusion 
(conflicting), 3) invalid argument, believable conclusion (conflicting), and 4) invalid argument, 
unbelievable conclusion (no conflict).  In these experiments, participants are instructed to ignore 
the content of the syllogism and treat it solely as a logical reasoning task.  As it turns out, this is very 
difficult for participants to do, and the believability of the syllogistic conclusion reliably influences 
whether or not the syllogism is accepted as valid.  Figure 1 displays the typical pattern of responses.  
Dual-process theory explains these results by proposing that in cases such as these, “although 
participants attempt to reason logically in accord with the instructions, the influence of prior beliefs 
is extremely difficult to suppress and effectively competes for control of the responses made” 
(Evans, 2003). 
Figure 1 
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I believe participant in Nichols and Knobe (2008) were operating under the influence of a highly 
similar effect.  It is possible to re-format the experimenters’ vignettes into syllogisms similar to 
those found in Evans et al. (1983): 
 1) Valid argument, believable conclusion (no conflict) 
  Bill lives in an indeterminist universe, where he has control of his actions. 
  Bill stalks and rapes a stranger. 
  Bill is fully morally responsible for stalking and raping a stranger. 
 2) Valid argument, unbelievable conclusion (conflict)* 
  Mark lives in an indeterminist universe, where he has control of his actions. 
  Mark cheats on his taxes. 
  Mark is fully morally responsible for cheating on his taxes. 
 3) Invalid argument, believable conclusion (conflict) 
  Bill lives in a determinist universe, where he has no control over his actions. 
  Bill stalks and rapes a stranger. 
  Bill is fully morally responsible for stalking and raping a stranger. 
 4) Invalid argument, unbelievable conclusion (no conflict) 
  Mark lives in a determinist universe, where he has no control over his actions. 
  Mark cheats on his taxes. 
  Mark is fully morally responsible for cheating on his taxes. 
 
In the case of Nichols and Knobe (2008) it most likely is not the believable/unbelievable 
distinction that is doing most of the work, but rather, exactly as they suggest, the high/low affect 
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distinction.  Rather than variance in believability of the conclusions themselves, in Nichols and 
Knobe’s study it may have been the strength of participants’ desire to believe the conclusions 
which varied.  However, I do not believe this is a crucial point. Emotional thinking plays just as 
much into System 1 as believability.  As a result, when the results of Nichols and Knobe’s results 
are graphed (Figure 2), they look strikingly similar to those of subjects operating under a belief-bias 
effect.  The only place the two patterns differ slightly is in the “valid argument, unbelievable 
conclusion” condition.  This is likely due in part to the fact that the moral nature of these 
“syllogisms” is more familiar to most people.  Consequently, this makes them easier to reason 
through, not unlike contextualizing the Wason card selection task. Cosmides and Tooby (1992) 
showed that when this difficult reasoning task, which normally involves following formal rules 
about letters and numbers, is couched in familiar social contexts, people’s performance jumps 
dramatically. A similar effect could be at play in Nichols and Knobe’s “valid, unbelievable” 
condition.  Also, the statement “Mark is fully morally responsible for cheating on his taxes,” is not 
really that unbelievable, nor is it emotionally charged and therefore distorting.  It is merely neutral 
rather than negative. In short, enough features of this condition align with the heuristics of System 
1 for people to produce a logically correct judgment most of the time.  The other three conditions 
resemble the classic belief-bias effect much more closely.  I believe this is strongly suggestive of a 
dual-process mechanism—a System 1/System 2 effect—in people’s moral reasoning process.  
Figure 2 
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Order Effects 
 In addition to the affective biases demonstrated by Knobe (2003) and Nichols and Knobe 
(2008), lately another type of intuitional instability has received much attention in the experimental 
philosophy literature.  Order effects, or variation in participant responses depending on the order 
in which the conditions are presented, have recently been shown to influence intuitions in certain 
cases, as well.  Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg (2008) conducted a study in which they examined 
people’s intuitions on Keith Lehrer’s famous Truetemp thought experiment, which is typically 
cited as evidence against reliabilism10 as a definition for knowledge.  The standard thought 
experiment goes as follows: 
Suppose a person, whom we shall name Mr. Truetemp, undergoes brain surgery by an 
experimental surgeon who invents a small device which is both a very accurate 
thermometer and a computational device capable of generating thoughts. The device, call it 
a tempucomp, is implanted in Truetemp’s head so that the very tip of the device, no larger 
than the head of a pin, sits unnoticed on his scalp and acts as a sensor to transmit 
																																								 																				
10	Reliabilism	is	the	idea	that	a	belief	counts	as	knowledge	if	it	is	formed	or	sustained	by	a	reliable	cognitive	
process.	
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information about the temperature to the computational system of his brain. This device, 
in turn, sends a message to his brain causing him to think of the temperature recorded by 
the external sensor. Assume that the tempucomp is very reliable, and so his thoughts are 
correct temperature thoughts. All told, this is a reliable belief-forming process. Now 
imagine, finally, that he has no idea that the tempucomp has been inserted in his brain, is 
only slightly puzzled about why he thinks so obsessively about the temperature, but never 
checks a thermometer to determine whether these thoughts about the temperature are 
correct. He accepts them unreflectively, another effect of the tempucomp. Thus, he thinks 
and accepts that the temperature is 104 degrees. It is. Does he know that it is? (Lehrer, 
1990, pp. 163-164) 
 
According to reliabilism, Mr. Truetemp does know that it is 104 degrees since his belief is caused 
by a reliable cognitive process.  But most people have the intuition that Mr. Truetemp, for some 
reason, does not really know that it is 104 degrees, and this is supposed to count as evidence 
against reliabilism. 
Swain and colleagues took a different approach to this thought experiment.  In their study, 
they utilized four different thought experiments, varying only the order in which they were 
presented.  One thought experiment presented a clear case of knowledge, involving a chemist who 
correctly realized that the mixing of two chemicals produces a toxic gas.  Another presented a clear 
case of non-knowledge, in which a man sometimes gets a “special feeling” before flipping a coin, 
and when he gets this special feeling he can predict the outcome of the coin flip about half of the 
time.  The third thought experiment was an uncertain case of knowledge, where a woman 
unknowingly driving through a countryside movie set sees the only real barn among a whole 
population of fake barns.  The fourth was the Truetemp case.  Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg 
hypothesized that when first presented with a clear case of knowledge (i.e. the chemist case), 
participants would be less likely to attribute knowledge to Mr. Truetemp.  Conversely, when first 
presented with a clear case of non-knowledge (correctly predicting 50 percent of coin flips), they 
would be more likely to attribute knowledge to Mr. Truetemp.  This is exactly what they found.  
The authors take this to be especially important because in Lehrer’s book, the chapter in which 
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the Truetemp case is introduced immediately follows a chapter on paradigm cases of knowledge, 
such as perceptual knowledge and knowledge of mathematics.  They believe this has a similar 
effect as their Chemist case, making the reader less likely to attribute knowledge to Mr. Truetemp.  
This is an especially clear example of how a lack of understanding of intuitions can have profound 
consequences—many factors other than the folk concept of knowledge are clearly at play here.  A 
final point was also interesting: people’s intuitions on the fake barn case, which was also an 
uncertain case of knowledge, remained surprisingly stable regardless of the order of presentation.  
This raises the additional question of how to know a priori which intuitions are susceptible to 
biasing effects and which are not (Swain, Alexander, & Weinberg, 2008).  
 Similarly to affective biases, order effects have been shown to impact intuition formation in 
multiple different areas of philosophical discussion.  Cushman and Mele (2008), for example, 
return to the question of intentional action.  The authors borrowed the thought experiment about 
the CEO harming or helping the environment from Knobe (2003), and also generated 15 more of 
their own, similar cases.  Approximately half of the subjects saw the CEO harm case within the first 
four cases presented; the other half saw it within the last four cases presented.  They found that, 
“subjects were five times as likely to judge that the CEO did not intentionally harm the 
environment when responding toward the end of the test, compared to subjects who responded to 
CEO harm towards the beginning” (Cushman & Mele, 2008, p. 176).  Whatever the reason for 
this, it is clear that something outside the thought experiment itself is influencing people’s 
judgments about it.  This is a major problem for experimental philosophers.  Any inference from 
survey results to the actual folk concepts which are supposedly behind them runs the risk of 
overlooking order effects, affective biases, or any number of as yet undiscovered influences which 
may be getting in the way. 
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I have reviewed only a handful of the various studies experimental philosophy studies 
which point to seemingly non-normative, outside influences on people’s intuitions.  In addition to 
the intrapersonal instability described in the preceding section, there is a wealth of equally 
fascinating studies on patterns of interpersonal differences.  Responses vary between cultures 
(Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich, 2008; Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001), between gender 
(Zamzow & Nichols, 2009; Buckwalter & Stich, 2014), even between socioeconomic classes 
(Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001), none of which should normatively have any bearing on 
universal questions of truth, right and wrong, or the nature of consciousness, to give a few 
examples. 
 
Some Hope for Intuitions?  
So, what does all this instability and variability mean for experimental philosophers?  Are 
intuitions totally epistemically useless, or is there some way they can be saved?  This is a topic of 
spirited debate in the experimental philosophy literature.  On the one side, there those like Stacey 
Swain and Jonathan Weinberg who believe intuitions are far too open to outside, normatively 
irrelevant factors, and philosophy should do away with appealing to them altogether.  On the other 
side, there are some equally interesting defenses of intuitions.  Recall that the most worrying point 
made by Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg is not that a wide swath of our intuitions may potentially 
be unstable, but that we have no way of predicting which intuitions these will be.  Wright (2014) 
argues that this is not true—we do, in fact, have ways of predicting the stability of our intuitions.  In 
two studies, Wright showed that confidence, belief strength, and perceived paradigmaticity were all 
significant predictors of the stability of a particular intuition.  People’s confidence in cases like 
Truetemp tended to be low, and thus subject to the order effects demonstrated by Swain and 
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colleagues.  But confidence and strength of belief tended to be quite high in cases like the Chemist, 
and these cases showed no order effects at all.  If Wright is correct, and there is a way to a priori 
predict the extent to which an intuition is subject to bias, this is certainly good news for traditional 
philosophers and positive-program experimental philosophers. 
In the end, however, I doubt the usefulness of confidence and belief strength in the 
problem of intuitions.  They may be able to predict which intuitions will be stable and which will 
be unstable; however, in general, those intuitions which are the most stable tend to be the least 
philosophically interesting. I do not believe that clear-cut cases of knowledge, like the Chemist, 
provide us with much information about the concept of knowledge itself.  If we want to know the 
size and shape of the concept of knowledge, we have to find its boundaries. This means venturing 
into and embracing the unstable territory of cases like Truetemp, with all its order effects, affective 
biases, etc.  However, because these questions are so complex and unclear, in order to explore 
them experimental philosophers need more sophisticated tools than surveys to properly do the 
job.  We must be able to pull apart the various systems and other factors which play a role in the 
formation of our intuitions, and surveys are ill-equipped for this task.  In short, if experimental 
philosophers wish to find the borders of concepts such as knowledge, I believe they must explore 
the fringes of these concepts with more resolution and specificity than intuition-based surveys can 
provide.  
 
My View 
In many ways, the debate over the epistemic value of intuitions is the debate over the future 
of experimental philosophy, or at least what form it will take.  But regardless of which side of the 
fence one comes down upon—the positive program or the negative program—it is fairly clear that 
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something has to change.  Minor qualms with certain methodologies aside, the experimental 
evidence is pretty undeniable: the traditional method of appealing to intuitions as evidentiary 
support for philosophical theories seems to be untenable.  So, what is the correct way to view 
intuitions? And given this correct view, how must the traditional philosophical method change to 
accommodate it?   
I believe there are two strong candidates for the correct way to view intuitions. First, it 
could be that experimental philosophy is more or less on the right track; intuitions could be the 
end product of a variable collection of cognitive processes.  As an analogy, consider the everyday 
act of driving, for instance to cousin Bobby’s house.  Say my sister and I start from the same house, 
but we each take a different route to get to Bobby’s.  So we start in the same place and end in the 
same place, but take different paths in between.  If this is the case with intuition, then it makes 
sense to continue to refer to intuition as we always have, as one concept.  The challenge for 
experimental philosophy, then, is to start from “Bobby’s house” (intuition) and re-trace the routes 
my sister and I both took to get there, which will lead them to our “home” (underlying concept).  
This is a very crude analogy, but I hope it illustrates the point.  
I believe there is also a second, slightly more radical possibility.  It could be that the correct 
way to view intuitions is to stop viewing them as intuitions—to stop viewing them as one unitary 
concept that must be defined in one and only one way.  To use the same analogy as the previous 
case, intuitions would be more like “cousins” than “cousin.”  My sister and I would start from the 
same house, take different roads, but I end up at cousin Bobby’s house and she ends up at cousin 
Billy’s house.  Intuitions on moral responsibility, for example, may be completely different in 
nature than intuitions on consciousness, or intuitions on free will.  On this view, not only would we 
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arrive at our intuitions in various ways, but the end products are inseparable from the paths by 
which we arrive at them, causing the end products to be different in kind, as well.     
 Surprisingly to me, it seems that while this second view has been half-acknowledged in 
some papers, no one has ever seriously considered this possibility.  To the best of my knowledge, 
multiple kinds of intuitions have only been considered as competitors to one another.  Weinberg 
et al. (2001) distinguish between different kinds of intuitions in their replies to possible objections, 
essentially delineated by how much reflective thought they involve.  There is clearly the 
implication, however, that some intuitions are better than others.  Also, as previously mentioned, 
Joshua Alexander (2012) addresses the issue more explicitly, outlining five different competing 
definitions of intuitions.  There is the Doxastic Conception, which treats intuition as a synonym of 
belief, all the way up through the Methodological Conception, which treats them as, “mental states 
ratified by a process of philosophical reflection” (p. 25).  Each of them have their strengths and 
weaknesses, and are endorsed by different philosophers.  But none of them seem to cover all that 
we call intuition (Alexander, 2012).   
Alexander presents these various accounts as competitors.  However, if we were to stop 
viewing intuition as one entity, they may not necessarily have to be.  My speculation is that all of 
the conceptions presented by Alexander can be found in philosophy, maybe even within 
experimental philosophy.  As a brief example, recall the Nichols and Knobe (2008) experiment on 
Natural Compatibilism (NC) versus Natural Incompatibilism (NI) (described on pp. 18-19 of this 
paper), which found that emotionally charged scenarios elicit NC intuitions and emotionally 
neutral scenarios elicit NI intuitions.  Feltz, Cokely, and Nadelhoffer (2009) conducted a follow-up 
study which at first seems to challenge Nichols and Knobe (2008).  There was only one difference 
between the two studies:  Nichols and Knobe utilized a between-subjects experimental design, 
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while Feltz, Cokely, and Nadelhoffer utilized a within-subjects design.  In a between-subjects 
design, participants only see one of the four possible scenarios (deterministic/intedeterministic x 
high/low affect).  In a within-subjects design, however, participants saw all four possible scenarios 
and could compare them side-by-side.  As a result, in Feltz, Cokely, and Nadelhoffer (2009), 
participants gave much more stable, consistent answers than those in Nichols and Knobe (2008).  
If we allow for the co-existence of multiple conceptions of intuitions, then the results of these two 
studies are not in conflict, as the authors believe them to be.  Because of the experimental design, 
Nichols and Knobe’s participants may have primarily utilized a doxastic-conception type of 
intuition, while Feltz, Cokely, and Nadelhoffer’s participants may have primarily utilized a 
methodological-conception type of intuition.  Each may be able to tell us something different about 
the psychology involved in the complex debate between NC and NI.  
At this point it is too early to say with confidence which view, the intuition-as-end-product 
view or the intuition-as-conflation view, is closest to the truth.  Regardless, I believe more 
investigation into intuitions themselves is needed; not just as windows to our folk philosophical 
concepts, but in their own right.  A deeper understanding and more fine-grained vocabulary of 
cognitive processes that play a role in the formation of philosophical beliefs would breathe some 
fresh air into modern philosophy, and bring it closer to the empirical (and in some cases purely 
descriptivist, as I will explain) field of study which analytic philosophers always wanted it to be.   
AN EVOLVING METHODOLOGY 
If experimental philosophers can force this kind of a change, I think they can make an 
incredibly valuable contribution to the future of philosophy.  That being said, in order to do this 
they will need to make some significant changes, themselves.  Anyone who does work in the field 
33	
	
of experimental philosophy needs to possess not only knowledge of empirical methods and 
statistics, but also knowledge of the relevant psychological (or other scientific) literature which 
relates to their area of investigation.  I believe the dual-process theory of reasoning, for example, 
should have been invoked in discussions of affective bias from the beginning.  This once again 
raises the other point made by Jesse Prinz (2008), that the main focus of experimental philosophy 
has been on laypeople’s concepts, not the processes by which they generate them.  He argues that 
to explore this latter question, a deeper understanding of psychology and its methods is needed 
within experimental philosophy.  When coupled with arguments such as those in Alexander, 
Mallon, and Weinberg (2014) and Kauppinen (2007), however, one consistent theme emerges: 
surveys are not the answer.  If experimental philosophy is to make significant contributions to our 
understanding of philosophical concepts and thought processes, it needs to evolve and start using 
more genuinely psychological methodologies.  Admittedly, this does blur the lines between 
philosophy and psychology to a considerable degree.  But similar to my views on Wright’s (2014) 
experiment, I believe gray area between what we normally consider to be philosophy and 
psychology is probably more interesting and more informative for the question of intuitions than 
the traditional core of each discipline.  Even if this sort of experimental philosophy which I am 
proposing does cross the border and become bona-fide cognitive psychology, I still believe it is a 
necessary step which experimental philosophy must take if it wishes to achieve its original goal of 
understanding our folk philosophical concepts.  The “black box” of survey-gathered intuitions 
currently prevents this sort of understanding, but if experimental philosophy can utilize other 
psychological methods, it may really start to get somewhere.  
Auspiciously, such changes are already starting to take place.  The recently published 
Experimental Philosophy: Volume 2 (Nichols & Knobe, 2014), for example, includes a reaction 
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time study by Arico et al. (2014), in which they demonstrate that people are slower to deny 
consciousness to entities that merely possess simple characteristics like eyes and interactive 
behavior.  This implies that the recognition of an entity as an agent, which the above characteristics 
trigger, plays a significant role in the attribution of conscious states.  Young, Nichols, and Saxe 
(2010) used behavioral and fMRI methods to investigate cases where “bad luck” seems to 
influence moral judgments. They show that the major factor in cases involving moral luck is not 
whether an agent’s action results in a harmful outcome, but whether or not people feel the agent 
was justified in believing that his action would not cause a harmful outcome.  Studies such as these 
eliminate much of the ambiguity that plagues survey studies, and, I believe, are blazing a trail which 
the rest of experimental philosophy should follow.  
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE EXPLORATION  
 A shift in methodology—away from surveys and towards other, more commonly used 
techniques—would not only improve the quality of experimental philosophy results, but would also 
allow it to explore previously untapped areas of philosophy.  The overwhelming majority of 
experimental philosophy studies conducted thus far have been in the fields of epistemology, 
action, and ethics, with a few forays into the philosophy of mind and metaphysics.  This is all well 
and good, experimental philosophy can make valuable contributions to these areas if conducted in 
the right way.  But I believe the canon of Western philosophy is replete with questions that lend 
themselves to empirical investigation, even in some unlikely places.  I believe empirical 
investigations of some the writings of Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Foucault, as just a few examples, 
could yield some fascinating results. 
Wittgenstein 
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Ludwig Wittgenstein was decidedly anti-empirical.  For this reason, I believe his 
Philosophical Investigations (2009) (PI) presents an interesting challenge to experimental 
philosophy, mainly for two reasons.  First, it first poses a challenge to experimental philosophy’s 
mere existence, and second, if the first challenge can be overcome, I believe it opens up a great 
deal of Wittgenstein’s writings to empirical exploration.  Wittgenstein himself was diametrically 
opposed to this idea of philosophy as science.  In the PI he writes, “It was correct to think that our 
considerations must not be scientific ones…And we may not advance any kind of theory.  There 
must be nothing hypothetical in our considerations.  All explanation must disappear, and 
description alone must take its place” (§109).  Somewhat unexpectedly, this, by itself, fits well with 
my own personal vision for experimental philosophy.  I believe it is most valuable as a descriptive 
project, just as Wittgenstein believed for philosophy as a whole, but if it ventures into theory it may 
find itself on shaky ground.  Experimental philosophy’s value, to borrow Wittgenstein’s words, is 
that it reminds us that, “The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of 
their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before 
one’s eyes)” (§129).  Wittgenstein believed that by paying careful attention to the language we use 
in everyday situations, we could discover these hidden features of life.  In a certain sense I agree 
completely; there is much to be discovered in the language we take for granted.  That being said, in 
working primarily with European languages and cultures Wittgenstein may have had an incomplete 
picture.  This incompleteness is revealed by none other than experimental philosophy.  In support 
of his argument against the idea of private language, Wittgenstein says the following: “In what sense 
are my sensations private? – Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person 
can only surmise it. – In one way this is false, and in another nonsense.  If we are using the word 
“know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if 
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I’m in pain” (§246).  Empirical epistemology studies, however, have given us fairly convincing 
evidence that the ordinary usage of the word “know” depends on where you are and who you ask 
(Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006).  This is not to say that 
Wittgenstein’s remarks are necessarily invalidated by such findings.  It may be the case that once 
we have a complete picture of the ordinary usage of the word “know,” Wittgenstein’s invocation of 
it will remain perfectly valid.  At this point, however, we cannot know for sure.  In order to be sure, 
I think experimental philosophy’s priority should be mapping out the usage of “know” and other 
major concepts like it.  Lest anyone think that removing the theorizing element reduces its status, 
or makes it just another social science, Wittgenstein, once again, puts it in perspective, “…this 
description gets its light – that is to say, its purpose – from the philosophical problems…The 
problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long 
been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the 
resources our language” (§109). 
Foucault 
This emphasis on description as the primary purpose of philosophy is made even clearer 
by the writings of Michel Foucault.  Whereas Wittgenstein was concerned primarily with language, 
Foucault was a philologist and a philosopher of politics, among other things.  Describing his own 
work, Foucault writes in his Dits et écrits, “Very schematically, it is this: to try to recover in the 
history of science, of knowledges [connaissances] and of human knowledge [savoir humain] 
something that would be like the unconscious of it…that would have its own rules, as the 
unconscious of the individual human being also has its rules and its determinations” (Davidson, 
1997, p. 7).  Already the similarities are striking between Foucault and this new experimental 
philosophy paradigm.  Experimental philosophy has mainly focused on individuals, their concepts, 
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and the processes by which they form them; it has only invoked culture to the extent that it 
explains these patterns.  However, it is not difficult to see how its research program could be 
expanded to a macro scale, studying societies and civilizations as a whole.  Joshua Knobe 
practically says as much in his “Experimental Philosophy Manifesto.”  He claims that for most of 
the history of philosophy, “it wasn’t particularly important to keep philosophy clearly distinct from 
psychology, history, or political science.  Philosophers were concerned, in a very general way, with 
questions about how everything fit together.  The new movement of experimental philosophy 
seeks a return to this traditional vision” (Knobe, 2008).  Foucault’s writings on language, politics, 
and society are practically a tailor-made entry point for experimental philosophy.  One instance of 
this is Foucault’s inquiry into the relationship between structural linguistics and society.  Speaking 
on these ideas, Arnold Davidson writes,  
Given this type of analysis, the important empirical question arises, ‘Up to what point can 
relations of a linguistic type be applied to other domains and what are these other domains 
to which they can be transposed?’  But Foucault turns directly to a second question… are 
these kinds of relations, discovered by structural linguistics and perhaps extendable (this is 
the first empirical question) to myths, narratives, kinship, and society in general, capable of 
being completely formalized? (pp. 8-9).  
I think this would make for a fascinating mix of experimental and historical research, and is 
perfectly suited for the social psychological methods experimental philosophy employs.  It may 
also give experimental philosophy a chance to defend itself against some of the claims made by 
Wittgenstein, who believed that linguistic relations held all the answers to the societal and 
epistemological questions listed by Davidson.  Foucault probably also believed this, but he was 
more skeptical; he did not believe we could assume as much a priori.  This difference is crucial—it 
is the difference between experimental philosophy being useful, or useless.  The safe bet, in my 
mind, is to side with Foucault.  We may discover Wittgenstein is right, and we were simply overly 
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cautious.  It would be a shame, however, to assume as much from the start and potentially miss 
something of major importance. 
 Despite this one major difference between Wittgenstein and Foucault, in many other ways 
they had remarkably similar views, to the benefit, I think, of experimental philosophy.  A specific 
example of this can be found in Foucault’s ideas on relations of power—not only in the sense of 
international economics or political hegemons, but also the power of paradigms and ideas.  If 
nothing else, a better understanding of this would allow philosophy to view itself in the mirror.  
Channeling Wittgenstein’s idea that “One is unable to notice something—because it is always 
before one’s eyes”(§129), Foucault claimed, “‘the task of philosophy today could well be, What are 
these relations of power in which we are caught and in which philosophy itself, for at least one 
hundred and fifty years, has been entangled?’” (Davidson, 1997, p. 3).  If “analytic philosophy” is 
substituted for “relations of power,” the resemblance to experimental philosophy is striking.  
Historically, and on a high level, we may have a rough approximation of how this analytical 
paradigm came to be dominant.  The details of this usurpation, however, and the specific ways in 
which it guides and shapes our thinking, are almost completely unexplored.  Experimental 
philosophy seems to me just the way to investigate these and other questions of power, in all its 
forms.  After all, psychology has already made some shocking discoveries on the power of 
conformity (Asch, 1951) and authority (Milgram, 1974), for example.  But in order to pursue 
Foucault’s questions, experimental philosophy will need to make some revisions to its research 
paradigm.  It cannot approach these questions of power in the same way it has approached 
intuitions.  Instead, as with intuitions, a different focus is needed.  Davidson, summarizing a 
passage by Foucault, says, “…we should not assume that relations of power have only one function; 
we should describe power, in all of its diversity and specificity, as it actually works” (p. 4).  
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Experimental philosophy needs to see past the traditional terminology and modes of thought, 
which are so pervasive they have become invisible, and become the truly descriptive project which 
Wittgenstein and Foucault sought.  
Cavell 
  Stanley Cavell’s writing has such an experimentalist flavor to it that, frankly, I am shocked 
no one in experimental philosophy has thought to call upon him before.  At any rate, the reason I 
do so here is, fittingly, given by Cavell himself when he says of Wittgenstein, “I find that his 
Philosophical Investigations often fails to make clear the particular way in which his examples and 
precepts are to lead to particular, concrete exercises and answers” (Cavell, 1969, p. XXV).  Cavell 
provides us with concrete exercises and answers which may help to jump start inquiry in the new 
direction suggested above.  Chapter 1 of Must We Mean What We Say deals largely with the 
above-mentioned issue of whether or not empirical investigation is necessary to affirm 
philosophical truths.  Wittgenstein did not believe it was; I think Foucault did.  Cavell falls 
somewhere in between, but in the process provides specific cases that could be useful in 
determining who was closest to the truth.  In his introduction of a debate between Gilbert Ryle and 
Benson Mates, which is highly similar to the difference I have framed between Wittgenstein and 
Foucault, Cavell writes, “One of Mates’ objections to Ryle can be put this way: Ryle is without 
evidence—anyway, without very good evidence—because he is not entitled to a statement of the first 
type (one which presents an instance of what we say) in the absence of experimental studies which 
demonstrate its occurrence in the language” (p. 4).  This might at first sound like a resounding (if 
anachronistic) endorsement of experimental philosophy, but Cavell quickly explains, “To answer 
some kinds of specific questions, we will have to engage in that ‘laborious questioning’ Mates insists 
upon, and count noses; but in general, to tell what is and isn’t English, and to tell whether what is 
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said is properly used, the native speaker can rely upon his own nose; if not, there would be nothing 
to count” (p. 4).  This statement is interesting for a number of reasons.  On the one hand, it is 
certainly true in some cases, and therefore lends support to the Wittgensteinian argument.  As a 
competent speaker of English, I am entitled to say “It is currently raining,” without taking a survey 
to verify that my fellow English speakers agree.  In fact, doing so might even confuse the issue by 
giving undue weight to the portion of people who would disagree because they have not been 
outside, have not seen the forecast, etc.; namely, the people who are subject to various 
performance errors, as was most likely the case in the thought experiment on the CEO 
intentionally helping or hurting the environment (Knobe, 2003).  
Statements on the weather are a pretty mundane example—Cavell provides more 
interesting ones.  A few pages after its initial introduction, he further explains his belief that 
competent speakers of a language have a right to claim “what we should mean in (by) saying 
[words]” using the example of the word “voluntarily” (p. 8).  According to Cavell, we only use 
“voluntarily” when something about a situation or an action is “fishy,” like if I was to ask someone, 
“Did you wear that hat voluntarily?”  Here, nothing about the denotative meaning of “voluntary” 
conveys this fishy sentiment, but it is an undeniable part of the word’s usage in ordinary language.  
Cavell says we understand this use of “voluntary” by virtue of being English speakers, and that no 
counting of noses is required.  This, according to him, is the normal state of affairs in the ordinary 
use of language.  In order for them to be justifiably questioned, there must be something weird 
going on.  He says, “My point about such statements, then, is that they are sensibly questioned only 
when there is some special reason for supposing what I say about what I…say to be wrong; only 
here is the request for evidence competent (p. 14).  
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This sounds about right, as far as it goes.  But I think experimental philosophy has given us 
at least some cause to doubt the universality of Cavell’s claims.  At one point, he writes, “I am 
prepared to conclude that the philosopher who proceeds from ordinary language is entitled, 
without special empirical investigation, to…assertions like, ‘We do not say “I know…” unless we 
mean that we have great confidence…,” and like, “When we ask whether an action is voluntary we 
imply that the action is fishy’” (p. 12).  However, I do not believe the first and the second example 
are equivalent.   The case of “voluntary” is much more limited in scope than the case of “know,” 
and I think this introduces complexities which make the two significantly different.  For instance, I 
do not think that if Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg were to re-run their order effects experiment, 
examining the concept of “voluntary” instead of “know,” would they attain the same results.  
“Know” is a much more versatile term—the pragmatics are much more complex, to use Cavell’s 
words—and this complexity introduces certain scenarios in which the usage of “know” is influenced 
by things like culture, emotion, order effects, etc.  So where do we draw the line on what we have a 
right to claim a priori and what must undergo experimental examination?  This is hard question to 
answer.  Ultimately, actually doing experiments, using a trial-and-error approach, may be the only 
way to find out. 
Summary 
In this section, I have tried to show, using a few specific examples, that the history of 
philosophy is riddled with claims and ideas which could benefit from experimental investigation.  
The three philosophers I have invoked here are not by any means exhaustive, but they provide 
some interesting beginning points which have not yet been addressed by experimental philosophy.  
To reiterate, Wittgenstein poses an interesting challenge to experimental philosophy in that he was 
a staunch opponent of the idea that empirical methods were necessary in philosophy.  He believed 
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that formal analysis of language could reveal rules and relationships that generalize to all aspects of 
life.  But Wittgenstein also saw philosophy’s role as being descriptive, not hypothetical or 
explanatory.  Foucault was similar in many ways; he believed that structural linguistics could shed 
much light on culture and history.  He believed, however, that this approach could only go so far.  
At a certain point we must get our hands dirty and investigate relations of power, for example, in 
their own right.  It takes a certain degree of experimental study to get at unconscious structures of 
individuals’ thought, and the same applies to societies.  Foucault thought, and I agree, that there is 
a great deal of value in understanding the gritty details of these unconscious structures—they allow 
us to truly understand the forces that shape our thoughts and actions.  It is a tall order, but I 
believe experimental philosophy is in a great position to go after just this kind of global description.  
Finally, Cavell falls somewhere in between.  Some of his examples show that empirical study has its 
limits, and it not always warranted.  Yet sometimes knowingly, sometimes unknowingly, leaves 
room for empirical study where Wittgenstein did not.  I do not claim to have any sort of 
conception on where to draw the line for experimental philosophy, and by extension empirical 
science as a whole, but finding that line could potentially be of great value in its own right. 
CONCLUSION 
 I hope I have been able to convey my belief that there is a very real need for experimental 
philosophy in the greater picture of modern philosophy, and modern psychology, too.  To quote 
Jesse Prinz (2008), echoing Kant: “Data without theory is empty, and theory without data is blind” 
(p. 205).  I believe experimental philosophy can provide a healthy dose of theory to relevant parts 
of psychology, and data to philosophy; provided it is conducted in a genuinely scientific way.  The 
field is young, and it has made progress, but experimental philosophy needs to continue to 
transition away from the use of primitive questionnaires in favor of more suitable research 
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methods.  What those methods are in practice will depend in part on the topic at hand.  In 
pursuing questions of consciousness and philosophy of mind, fMRI and other functional imaging 
techniques may be useful tools.  For epistemological and moral studies, reaction time and 
behavioral experiments may be a good choice.  A global theory of Foucault’s unconscious 
structures of power may require all of the above, in combination with historical research.  It is 
difficult to predict exactly what will be needed, but experimental philosophy cannot continue to shy 
away from the most appropriate methodologies due to a lack of expertise.  In the short term, I 
believe more active collaboration between experimental philosophers and psychology departments 
will greatly increase the quality of experimental studies.  This would almost certainly help to bring a 
more balanced focus to experimental philosophy, bringing the processes by which we form and 
use concepts up to an equal standing with the concepts themselves.  In the long term, I hope more 
and more contributors to the field will represent a “new breed” of cognitive scientists, trained in 
multiple disciplines from the start.  Again, I believe experimental philosophy is making progress in 
this direction, but there is much more progress yet to be made.  Personally, I think this is an 
exciting prospect.  So far, experimental philosophy’s main quest has been to define the space of 
intuitions, and the concepts the accompany them.  But if experimental philosophy can lead the 
way in breaking through the traditional mold of intuitions, entire new vistas will appear before 
philosophy—vistas that have always been invisible because they were right before our eyes.  
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